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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a case study for information sharing within a
public/private not-for-profit partnership organization called
ACTRA – Arizona Cyber Threat Response Alliance, Inc.. This
initiative is comprised of public and private entities with
government agencies as invited guests aligned around the goal of
improved response to cyber security events. Technical, political,
legal and organizational issues arise when multiple parties attempt
to exchange information in a formal setting. Benefits and specific
solutions developed are discussed. The study concludes with
several areas for future improvement and investigation as well as
recommendations for newly forming sharing groups.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Information and Data Sharing –
access controls, information flow controls, authentication See
also K.6.5. Intellectual Property, Government Privacy and Ethics.

General Terms
Security and Privacy

Keywords
TAXII, STIX, Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing, ISAO, ISAC

1. INTRODUCTION
The conceptual benefit of sharing cyber threat information is at
the heart of the current anti-malware industry led by companies
such as McAfee and Symantec. Information sharing among
different organizations without that same central provider has
been evolving in pockets with the FS-ISAC, formed in 1999, one
of the earliest examples. The move from theoretical benefits to
practical implementation of multi organization cyber threat
information sharing remains a challenge. New Information
Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO) constructs are being
encouraged and partially funded by government initiatives under
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Many organizations and participants today agree on why
information sharing is important. In a recent report to Congress
advantages described included greater agility and situational
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awareness as well as a “deeper understanding of threat actors’
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)” [1]. If properly
developed, shared information should lower the cost of defense
and increase the ability to discover compromised systems. A
survey of IT professionals (not all of whom were in formal shared
information networks) reported, however, that most of the threat
information they received was not timely or specific enough
(actionable) to meet their perceived need [2].
Cyber security professionals are today primarily embedded in the
IT organization though it is now clear that the impact to a
company or organization goes beyond the classic bounds of the
technical computer domain. Product information, business
strategies, sales and marketing contact information, and legal
documents stored electronically are supported by IT but are
fundamentally controlled and used by other organizations. Access
to these, their linkage with email accounts, web applications and
documents stored on a variety of platforms including mobile
devices and cloud systems stretches the ability of an IT
department to protect the data [3].
Furthermore, in the first version of the National Institute for
Standards and technology (NIST) cyber security framework, it is
highlighted that access to threat information including TTP is
critical to the development and maintenance of a robust cyber
security plan and implementation within an organization [4].
One of the goals of ACTRA and similar ISAO’s is to break down
the resistance to information sharing and engage not only the
technical workers but also the business leadership. The high level
management teams are best equipped to see the overall scale of
risk and reward beyond just the direct cost of spending on cyber
security. The success of information sharing requires the
development of metrics that can be gathered, monitored, analyzed,
and then effectively communicated to achieve improvement as
well as to continue justifying the expense of the practice [5].
A number of potential models for effective information sharing
have been proposed. It is the community of interest that must
implement and investigate the results of corporate and
government information exchange where the vast bulk of critical
assets sought by adversaries reside [6]. Cyber crime, increasingly
the work of large networks of individuals, is best countered with a
similarly organized structure [7].

2. ACTRA FORMATION
ACTRA grew out of relationships developed with FBI’s
InfraGard and the Arizona Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center
(ACTIC). When the Presidential directive 16363 was signed, it
lent credibility to the concept of bringing private sector
representatives to the table. The organization is incorporated as a
not for profit company with a board, a technical group of subject

matter experts as well as an advisory board from private and
public sector entities. This structure divides along lines of
business, policy and technology with interchange as needed to
create a functioning solution for the different requirements of the
constituents.

What is the role of academic members beyond the obvious special
case of alignment as either a public institution or private entity?
For researchers and students in the field of cyber intelligence and
security, public policy and law, it is an excellent opportunity for
study and experience.

The ACTIC, formed in 2005, is a government sharing structure
that was to address the challenges for timely exchange of
intelligence and critical information among state, local and federal
public safety agencies and ultimately provide a real-time
information link with law enforcement and first responders [8].

3.2 Legal and Financial Matters

ACTRA built on experience gained through the efforts to bridge
tribal, state, local and federal agencies, adding the dimensions of
the private sector and support of academic interests. The
foundation of the effort rests upon the desire to improve security
without adding another layer of expense or process that would be
a burden to members, resulting in a flat responsive structure that
today operates in near real-time.
This regional, cross industry information sharing group (ISAO)
provides the opportunity to have in person meetings creating trust
helping bridge organizational reluctance. ACTRA today has
grown to include 14 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and is
offering a multi-sector, regional and nationally scalable solution.

3. CHALLENGES
In late 2012 there were few examples of cross sector cyber threat
information sharing models, most were ad hoc and primarily point
to point informal sharing among colleagues. Much of the success
was hidden and below the approval radar of the organizations in
which workers operated. However this type of activity does not
scale nor can it be funded to become institutional. It may rely on
single points of contact that could move to a different job position
losing that valuable connection. ACTRA on the other hand was
designed to be visible at the C level organization to foster the
needed support for the technology wizards that would ultimately
have the challenge of implementation.

3.1 Organizational Issues and Concerns
Marketing and awareness was an initial hurdle and required
communication via phone, email and at events in what seemed
like a 24/7 campaign. CSO and CEO alike were at first reluctant
to enter into a new type of unproven relationship with potentially
competitive organizations. Worse perhaps, what does it mean to
share information with the government? In the past most people
and companies seek to remain out of the range of government
interaction.
Corporate members could benefit from classified or sensitive data
available from government agencies. Sharing with other
corporations can likewise provide coverage that no single
company no matter the size can hope to access. Many companies
are not practiced in the handling and dissemination of external
data. What is the profit motive and accountability structure?
Government entities enjoy certain protection from liability,
however, they are at risk if classified data is shared in an
irresponsible manner.
This can compromise on going
enforcement or surveillance activities and be costly in terms of
lost efforts and use of government funds. Individuals can also be
harmed in their careers should problems arise within their
jurisdiction.

It was recognized from the outset that a template non-disclosure
agreement (NDA) followed by a membership agreement was the
best approach to meeting the legal requirements of the different
organizations. As reviews occurred the template rapidly matured
and was able to be operational within 3 months. This put the
Alliance, formed as a nonprofit corporation at the hub of the
communications since the agreement is with the Alliance not with
the peers. This solved the potential nightmare of N2 agreements
as the network grew.
Key to the relationship was the agreement to protect the names of
members in the organization unless they were willing to be
associated in a public manner.
Some companies and
organizations were concerned that they would become a greater
target should they be identified as an active participant in
information sharing. The actual threat versus perceived threat is
still something to be measured.
It was also discovered that different types of members would be
required in order to gain the advantage of disparate players. As
will be further discussed in future work, this is an issue
particularly for smaller organizations that may benefit from
sharing yet can not participate fully for either technical or
financial reasons.
Would there be increased liability for a company if it received
threat information that was not promptly utilized? This scenario is
playing out in a recently settled court case with retail giant Target
and its potential inaction in 2013 to vulnerabilities. The cost to a
company in legal and financial fallout could be large. Faced with
undefined risk, corporate members seek to limit their exposure
with legal and policy choices that are being discussed in new
legislative proposals.

3.3 Technical Hurdles
As security organizations scramble to keep up with the everevolving threats, each organization develops its own methods and
practices. Best practices differ by industry sector as well as by the
size of the organization. Sophisticated and larger organizations
with strong technical cyber security teams utilize network
monitoring, intrusion detection and other management tools.
These can integrate external threat data in manual or even
automatic modes. The mechanism for translating threats into a
standard format and framework has improved but is still in an
early stage. The decision to utilize STIX and TAXII as the
interface puts a burden on less able or resourced organizations
[9]. There is additional potential risk in connecting networks even
if the reason is for the sharing of sanitized indicators. This is
mitigated by implementation of appropriate internal processes.

4. SOLUTIONS AND BENEFITS
ACTRA was able to build on developments and experiments from
other sharing organizations such as the ISACs and government
inter agency experiences thanks to the broad skill set of the
different invested participants. Even so, solutions necessarily
have evolved and will continue to shift. As more organizations
join, the tools and techniques will mature.

It was recognized that information was valuable on different time
scales. The ideal state is for a threat or vulnerability to be
discovered rapidly, characterized and communicated in a timely
and actionable manner. As taken from Verizon’s 2013 study on
data breaches shown in Table 1, this desire does not match well
with the reality of cyber threats [10].
Table 1. Time scale disparity: compromise vs discovery; the
fraction of breaches and the time to damage and discovery.
Timescale

Minutes

Hours

Days

Weeks

Damage

23%

60%

13%

3%

Discovery

1%

9%

11%

78%

Damage is done in seconds, minutes, and hours while discovery
and containment are more often measured in days, weeks or even
months. Of course it is possible that the early stages of
reconnaissance and planning are also on a longer time scale.
These activities are today not visible. This issue points to the
leading edge of cyber security research – what tools and
techniques can close this gap? Is information sharing in the form
of a larger but more loosely coupled information gathering honey
net coupled with intelligent mining and pattern analysis able to
shift the advantage?

4.1 Situational Awareness – White Papers
At the policy and educational level, ACTRA has been successful
in raising awareness in the highest levels of organizations. These
products provide insights, best practices, and tips for improving
awareness among the users within an organization. One example
is a debrief on some of the valuable learning from the recent
incident where a corporation such as SONY was targeted by a
nation state level threat actor with intent to damage not just gain
financially or exfiltrate intellectual property. The papers are
appropriate to the slower time scale and meant to be consumed via
email. Their impact is on policies and procedures, offering a
reminder to practice and keep frameworks alive and changing.
Based upon comparisons within ACTRA, teams that have a clear
response plan and procedures, and most importantly practice
disaster scenarios, are better able to handle actual situations.
Sharing of these best practices, backup and recovery techniques
and example plans has been rated very useful.
Companies are also re-packaging threat information and white
papers, providing a version as educational outreach to include the
“end user” in the cyber security defense plan. Data inputs for
enriching threats intelligence is also available through outreach
via “crowd sourcing”. This changes it from some abstract item to
a current and actual example.

4.2 News and Blog Site
ACTRA has developed an invitation only site to allow members
to access information on their schedule rather than push via email.
A user can then request notification when a new entry of interest
is posted. Information is categorized based on the survey
responses for types relevant to the member. The site has an
editorial board and a process for creating articles, alerts, and
intelligence briefs. Members can also contribute posts or
comments. This is successfully utilizing university students to
seek relevant material via open source (OSINT) methods, which

provides an excellent experience for the students and a cost
effective resource to the Alliance.

4.3 Alerts
More actionable and timely are the official use only alerts
including FOUO information with specific data from on-going
investigations, analysis or active events. Though these may still
be old compared to the actual initial breach, it is early in the
analysis lifecycle so not all attribution or analysis is available.
Examples include potential IP addresses, web addresses, code
samples, and hash signatures associated with a specific known
event. This can be utilized by an IT organization to update
firewall or intrusion detection systems (IDS) rules, compare with
logs from their own organization network feeds and potentially
create additional data from their early alert. ACTRA disseminates
these in both classified and un-classified settings through its
vetted and pre-trusted relations.
This is one of the more sensitive types of communication as it
represents information that, if leaked, could alert the attacker of
the ability to identify possibly causing them to go underground,
change their TTP or accelerate plans with any existing campaign.
ACTRA has created limited distribution lists and the efforts are
rated as beneficial by recipients. They would like to see more
timely and actionable alerts and this is an area of future growth.
Separate classified briefings were held with invitation only and
pre-registered list used to validate attendees. This met the
security needs of the public agencies as well as provided greater
access to intelligence to the private sector participants.

4.4 Automated Data
The most exciting development is the acquisition and
dissemination of threat data that is closer to real time based on
information gathered from IDS, security information and event
management (SIEM) solutions and investigations. The goal of
this work is to achieve a machine to machine connection that can
be used along with other threat intelligence data in the security
operations center of member organizations. The groups have
agreed to utilize the NIST/MITRE standard STIX/TAXII.
Vendors are supporting the import of data and discussions are
beginning to consider creating an international standard. The
Alliance members’ implementation is still in the early stages.
Those participating indicate a strong interest in continuing and
rate the value of the effort as high.
The most successful operational efforts occur from member
contributions which can include zero day events. In the past
month automated feeds have come on-line with 30,000+ events all
available to members

4.5 Survey on Benefits
In the early stage of ACTRA formation, a survey was developed
to understand what kinds of information would be valuable, who
the expected audience was and how the data should be delivered.
This helped to develop the products and organize the Alliance.
The results were consistent with larger surveys [11] and the
survey included some questions to allow correlation. One of the
results found was that top leadership, including the board, is
generally uninvolved. This was important in the decision to target
the C-level and board level of member organizations with
appropriate materials.
The area of greatest interest by the survey respondents was
support or intelligence on advanced persistent threats (APT). This

has been a focus for the think tank group within the Alliance and
remains an area of future growth. New tools and incident
management systems appear promising and more are supporting
the chosen exchange formats.
A new follow up survey to assess how the Alliance has performed
in meeting the expectations of its members has begun. The full
results of that new survey, though not available yet, will help
guide new investments over the next year. Early indications point
to continued technical and monetary investment in ACTRA, a
desire to connect with other organizations and enhancement of the
real time components.

5. FUTURE EFFORTS
Continued operations and enhancement of the present set of
offerings point to a change in the all-volunteer model. The ability
to deliver products in a timely and predictable manner with loose
accountability is problematic. An aspect of this was apparent in
the predominance of larger corporations among the members.
Smaller organizations cannot spare their already limited resources
on a regular basis. The organization is looking at a variety of
different models as well as seeking other sources for funding to
create a core team.
As seen in recent security breaches and reported in surveys,
smaller companies in the supply chain have been targeted as
means to access ultimate higher value assets. It is critical to
include smaller members of the supply chain in future initiatives
and this has begun with educational efforts in cooperation with
the Arizona Tech Council. This will build the critical trust factor
without compromising the security of present members.

involvement for proactively coping with security threats and
exploits in a timely manner.
Recommendations: Other ISAO’s could benefit from the
experiences gained over the course of ACTRA early stages: 1)
Establish expectations and set realistic goals with at least semiannual review of progress; 2) Allow for changes in the plan,
admitting when adjustments are required; 3) Create an atmosphere
of transparency and inclusion. 4) Develop a core team and
leadership that is willing and able to meet regularly and often; 5)
Establish alternate representatives to maintain continuity; and 6)
Create a communication method for decisions, issues and
suggested solutions.
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